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The Constitutional Issues Surrounding the
Science-Religion Conflict in Public Schools:
The Anti-Evolution Controversy
Since the infamous Scopes trial the matter of the constitutional validity of
the "anti-evolution" laws has plagued both legal scholars and school ad-
ministrators. The courts have generally invalidated legislation which bans
outright the teaching of evolution in public schools, but with the advent of
the "balanced treatment" acts, a revival of this litigation has begun. The
author examines the constitutional analysis utilized by the courts in deal-
ing with the "anti-evolution" and "balanced treatment" acts and provides
an historical perspective of the first amendment to question the Court's re-
sponse to the issue.
"ALL FLESH IS NOT THE SAME FLESH, BUT THERE IS ONE FLESH OF MEN, AN-
OTHER FLESH OF BEASTS, ANOTHER OF FISHES, AND ANOTHER OF BIRDS."
I Cor. 15:39
I. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of religious freedom in contemporary society, per-
haps no issue more appropriately reflects the attitude of the
American judicial system than that of the conflict between the di-
vine statement of creation and the scientific theory of evolution,
as taught in our public schools. The continued refusal of the
courts to recognize the validity of the so-called anti-evolution leg-
islation placed before it illustrates the fundamental precept of the
establishment clause of the first amendment and the unwaivering
judicial guarding of that concept.
At the center of the controversy lie two types of enactments:
the first, simply known as anti-evolution laws, provides for a
black-letter prohibition on the teaching of the theory of evolution
in public schools.' The second group of laws, a modern revision
1. Historically, the anti-evolution statutes, commonly known as "monkey"
laws, have taken the form of a prohibition on the teaching of the doctrine that
mankind ascended from lower forms of animals. An example of these laws is
found in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 (1960 Repl. vol.) (found unconstitutional in Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). The text of the statute provided:
Doctrine of ascent or descent of man from lower order of animals prohib-
ited. - It shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any Uni-
versity, College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State,
which is supported in whole or in part from public funds derived by State
and local taxation to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended
of the first, are called balanced treatment acts. They require a
public school which chooses to teach the theory of evolution to
also teach the theory of divine creation.2 Both types of legisla-
tion, although quite different in language, have been viewed by
the courts as similar in impact and have been found to be invalid
intrusions of religious ideology into public institutions.
Notwithstanding the often predictable result of the litigation
surrounding the enactments, examination of the topic is essential
to a thorough understanding of the constitutional clauses in-
volved. Both modern and traditional anti-evolution laws demon-
strate a persistent fundamentalist effort to restrict the scope of
the scientific concepts presented in public schools. Treatment of
the laws, therefore, has displayed a unique balancing of interests
and has clearly indicated the extent to which the courts are will-
ing to permit religious ideology to effect public institutions. In
this respect the anti-evolution litigation has been instrumental in
the development and redefinition of the constitutional framework
utilized in the resolution of the issue.
In light of the importance of the distinction between the two op-
posing accounts of creation,3 a highlighting of the fundamental as-
pects of each may be helpful. The doctrine.of organic evolution is
or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall be unlwful
for any teacher, textbook commission, or other authority exercising the
power to select textbooks for above mentioned educational institutions to
adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches the doctrine
or theory that mankind descended or ascended from a lower order of
animals.
393 U.S. at 99 n.9. In the period from 1921 to 1929 twenty states introduced similar
legislation, often resulting in their repeal. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
101 n.8 (1968).
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1663 (Supp. 1981), the object of the most recent litiga-
tion on the subject, (see infra note 58 and accompanying text) is entitled "Re-
quirement for Balanced Treatment of Creation-Science and Evolution-Science,"
and is directed toward equal exposure of students to both dogmas, through class-
room lectures, textbook material, and other educational programs. See also ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 80-1664 (Supp. 1981), which requires both theories to be taught exclu-
sively through scientific evidence without reference to religious writings of any
kind. Similar "balanced treatment" acts have been passed or are currently being
considered in 18 states. Darwin Wins, Creationism "Is Not Science'" TIME Jan. 18,
1982 at 63.
3. Recognition of the distinguishing factors of the two doctrines is illustrated
by the following excerpt from Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927):
[The Statute] indicates an intention to set over, one against the other, the
theory, or 'story,' of man's Divine creation and the antagonistic and mate-
rialistic theory, or 'story,' of his origin in the animal kingdom, to the exclu-
sion of God. The phraseology is antithetical - a favorite form of
strengthening statement - 'Measures, not men,' Springing from God, not
animals. The two theories of man's origin are placed in direct
opposition ....
Id. at 125, 289 S.W. at 369 (Chambliss, J., concurring). C. HICKMAN, C. HICKMAN JR.,
F. HICKMAN, L. ROBERTS, INTEGRATED PRINCIPLES OF ZOOLOGY, 875 (6th ed. 1979).
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premised upon the theory that all forms of advanced life inhab-
iting the earth originated as lower forms of life, and through a
process of evolutionary transformation ascended to their current
status.4 This teaching notes that man is, in actuality, the mere re-
sult of automatic evolution without any intervention or spontane-
ous creation by a superior being or god.5 The divine account of
creation is a doctrine derived from the Bible and espoused by
both Jew and Christian as the inspired word of God.6 Perhaps
the most accurate description of this belief is found in the Bible
itself, in the Book of Genesis, where it is proclaimed:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness .... So
God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him;
male and female created he them .... And the Lord God formed man of
the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life;
4. This theory is primarily credited to Charles Darwin (1809-1882) (although
it did not, in fact, originate with him) and has come to be known appropriately as
"Darwinism." The primary contribution of Darwin to the idea of organic evolution
was his doctrine of natural selection, which is viewed as a logical explanation for
evolutionary change. The human species was not included in the evidence used to
support Darwin's theory but the implication was overwhelmingly clear; humans
had evolved from lower forms of life. Ironically, Darwin never argued that humans
were directly descended from apes, but rather that apes are merely the closest rel-
ative of humans. PRINCIPLES OF ZOOLOGY, supra note 3 at 875, 903. See C. DAR-
WIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859), for an indepth study of Darwin's work.
The primary thrust of the theory of evolution with repect to mankind centers
upon an examination of the evolutionary process surrounding the ;vertebrates.
Evolutionists proclaim that there is clear evidence of a development from fish to
amphibian, from amphibian to reptile and from reptile to mammal. Authority for
this conclusion is centered upon research of the stratum of the earth and the cor-
responding fossils found in each horizon. KOENIGSWALD, THE EVOLUTION OF MAN 2
(1962).
The first joint classification of man with apes as primates was made approxi-
mately two hundred years ago by Linneaus. Based upon anatomical, physiologi-
cal, embryological and serological investigations, modern evolutionists consider
this classification to be correct. Id. at 24. The most important primates from the
standpoint of human evolution are the Tarsioids, which live in Borneo and the
Philippines. The Tarsioids share many of the reproductive characteristics of the
higher apes and are considered to be the last descendents of a group of prosimi-
ans which share a common precursor with Anthropoidea. The anthropomorth is
the family most directly related to the history of man, and includes the Malay gib-
bon, the orangutan, and the chimpanzee. Id. at 25, 28. The commonalities of mod-
ern man and the large anthropoid apes suggest to the evolutionists that a common
ancestral link in the distant past - a missing link, existed. The characteristics or
timing of this link are unknown, but somewhere between the specific human trend
of evolution starting approximately 10,000,000 years ago in the Pliocene, and the
emergence of the first hominids 500,000 years ago, its existence is said to have oc-
curred. Id. at 130.
5. Wooten, The Scopes Case, 1 NOTRE DAME LAW, 11, 13 (1925).
6. Id. at 13-14.
and man became a living soul. 7
The biblical version of creation emphasizes a single divine act
rather than a process-result approach, and is based upon the idea
that God created the first man with virtually the same form and
characteristics as modern man. The relevancy of this distinction
to the litigation surrounding the issue becomes readily apparent
as the religious ramifications permeating the biblical account of
creation are introduced into the classroom setting. The contro-
versy raises both moral and legal questions which have been
dealt with by the legislatures and courts with varying degrees of
success.
While the importance of the characteristics and nature of the
two accounts of creation as seen through the eyes of scientists
and theologians cannot be downplayed, it is evident that a legal
analysis centered upon the impact of the two theories in the legal
realm must emphasize the legal, rather than philosophical argu-
ments involved. For this reason, the particular characteristics of
the two accounts will only be presented in this article where nec-
essary to highlight certain legal issues and principles.
With this in mind, the primary purpose of this article will be to
examine the prevalent judicial response to the issue of theories of
creation in public schools and to evaluate this response in light of
traditional constitutional analysis. Reference will be made to
both historical and current decisions of the courts involving the
issue in question, with the goal of providing an understanding of
the constitutional questions involved.
II. THE SCOPES CASE
No in-depth study of the judicial treatment of the anti-evolution
statutes can properly be completed without consideration of the
initial and most notable case on the subject: Scopes v. State. 8 The
case arose from the conviction of John Scopes on a violation of a
1925 anti-evolution statute when he taught Tennessee public
school children a theory which denied the story of the divine cre-
ation of man and instead espoused the idea that man descended
7. Genesis 1:26-27, 2:7 (King James). The Book of Genesis is not only an ac-
count of the birth of mankind but is a detailed examination of the origin of the
earth itself. For one analysis and explanation of Genesis see Is the Bible Really the
Word of God? WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA 11-34
(1969).
8. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The initial trial and appeal have re-
ceived worldwide recognition, and because of the novel issues involved, the pro-
ceedings have inherited labels ranging from "bizzare" Id. at 121, 289 S.W. at 367, to
"the world's most famous court trial," L. LEVY, THE WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS COURT
TRIAL: STATE OF TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS SCOPES (1971).
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from a lower order of animal.9 The trial judge assessed a fine of
$100.0010 and Scopes appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
After discounting arguments that the statute was uncertain in
its meaning, the court examined the contention that the Tennes-
see enactment violated both the Tennessee Constitution" and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, its federal coun-
terpart.'2 The court's rejection of this argument was based upon
the power of the state as an employer to regulate the duties of its
9. This anti-evolution law, enacted in March of 1925, entitled "An act prohibit-
ing the teaching of the evolution theory in all the universities, normals and other
public schools of Tennessee, which are supported in whole or in part by the public
school funds of the state, and to provide penalties for the violations thereof,"
provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennes-
see, That it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the Universities,
Normals, and all other public schools of the State, which are supported in
whole or in part by the public school funds of the State, to teach any the-
ory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man, as taught in the
Bible, and to teach instead, that man has descended from a lower order of
animals.
Section 2. Be it further enacted, That any teacher found guilty of the vio-
lation of this Act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be fined not less than one hundred ($100) dollars nor more than five
hundred ($500) dollars for each offense.
Section 3. Be it further enacted, That this Act take effect from and after
its passage, the public welfare requiring it.
154 Tenn. at 105, 289 S.W. at 363-64 n.1.
It is interesting to speculate about the circumstances which provoked the Ten-
nessee General Assembly to enact such legislation. It has been noted that three
main factors contributed to the legislative intent behind the law: 1.) an agressive
drive by members of the religious faction known as Fundamentalists; 2.) lack of
knowledge of prevalent scientific and religious thought in the politically control-
ling rural districts of Tennessee; and, 3.) political cowardice and demagogy. See
Walker, The Constitutionality of the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, 35 YALE L.J. 191
(1925). It has also been stated that motivations such as a desire to honor God, and
the fostering of religious values prompted the legislation. See Note, An Echo From
the Scopes Trial, 30 DICK. L. REV. 125, 140 (1926).
. 10. Although the constitutionality of the statute itself was upheld, the assess-
ment of the $100.00 fine against Scopes was found to be in violation of TENN.
CONST. art. VI, § 14, which required any fine in excess of $50 to be assessed only by
a jury. 154 Tenn. at 121, 289 S.W. at 367. Since the statute in question provided for
a minimum fine of $100.00, the court had no power to correct the error and the
lower court judgment was accordingly reversed. 154 Tenn. at 121, 289 S.W. at 367.
In the interest of putting "the bizarre case" to rest, a nolle prosequi was suggested
to the attorney general. 154 Tenn. at 121, 289 S.W. at 367.
11. TENN. CONST. art I, § 8 provides: "That no man shall be taken or impris-
oned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or
in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." At issue in this case was the "law of
the land" clause. 154 Tenn. at 111, 289 S.W. at 364..
12. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
servants and the nature of the relationship created in such situa-
tions.13 Analysis of the court began:
We think there is little merit in this contention. The plaintiff in error was
a teacher in the public schools of Rhea County. He was an employee of
the State of Tennessee or of a municipal agency of the State. He was
under contract with the State to work in an institution of the State. He
had no right or privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the
State prescribed. His liberty, his privilege, his immunity to teach and pro-
claim the theory of evolution, elsewhere than in the service of the State
was in no wise touched by this law.
14
The court reasoned that "[i]n dealing with its own employees en-
gaged upon its own work, the State is not hampered by the limita-
tions of [the constitutional clauses in question]."15 To emphasize
its view that the anti-evolution law was not an exercise of the po-
lice power of the state but rather was a utilization of its proprie-
tary authority, 16 the court cited various cases espousing the
state's power in its capacity as employer.17 The court then analo-
gized these cases to the Scopes controversy and concluded that
the state's power extends to the regulation of what may be taught
in its public schools and that such a regulation is consistent with
federal due process limitations.' 8
A further ground for attack of the anti-evolution statute as-
serted by Scopes was that the statute conflicted with a provision
of the Tennessee Constitution requiring the general assembly to
"cherish literature and science."' 9 The argument alleged that be-
cause the concept of the descent of man from a lower order of ani-
mals "is now established by the preponderance of scientific
thought,"20 a prohibition on the teaching of such doctrine would
13. See 154 Tenn. at 111-16, 289 S.W. at 364-66.
14. Id. at 111, 289 S.W. at 364 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 112, 289 S.W. at 365.
16. The significance of this distinction is that, as an exercise of the state's pro-
prietary powers, no violation of due process can be asserted with regard to the
Tennessee statute. See Note, The Constitutionality of the Tennesee Anti-Evolution
Law, 6 OR. L. REV. 130, 139-40 (1927).
17. These cases make it obvious that the State or Government, as an incident
to its power to authorize and enforce contracts for public services, "may require
that they shall be carried out only in a way consistent with its views of public pol-
icy and may punish a departure from that way." 154 Tenn. at 114, 289 S.W. at 365
(quoting Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 256 (1906)).
18. See 154 Tenn. at 115-16, 289 S.W. at 366.
19. Id. at 116, 289 S.W. at 366. TENN. CONST. of 1870 art. XI, § 12 stated in rele-
vant part: "It shall be the duty of the General Assembly in all future periods of
this government, to cherish literature and science." This section was eliminated in
the 1978 amendment of the Tennessee Constitution. See TENN. CONST. art XI, § 12.
20. 154 Tenn. at 116, 289 S.W. at 366. The author finds this argument puzzling
in that the theory of evolution has been, up to this date, just that - a theory, and
current arguments to the contrary, as well as the arguments raised in 1925, fall
short of concrete proof.
Darwin had not proved his case. It was still a theory not a fact proved.
Science finds some skeletons that it claims are one hundred thousand
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clearly be a violation of the constitutional directive to cherish sci-
ence. The court discounted this argument without regard to the
actual merits of the claim, limiting its attack to the objectives and
sufficiency of the constitutional provision itself.21
Another critical appraisal offered by the appellant of the Ten-
nessee statute focused on its alleged violation of article one, sec-
tion three of the state constitution, which provides in part: "that
no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious estab-
lishment or mode of worship."22 In disposing of this argument,
the court contended that it knew of no religion or faith which pre-
mised any creed or law upon the divine statement of creation,
thus concluding that a prohibition on the teaching of evolution
could not possibly give preference to any religious establishment
or mode of worship.23 To reinforce this argument the court noted
that the statute required the teaching of nothing; rather, it only
forbade the teaching of evolution.24 The court here inferred that
since nothing contrary to the theory of evolution must be taught
in the schools, then a charge that the law prefers a religious es-
tablishment would be inappropriate.
The Scopes case is deserving of attention in a study of the con-
flict between science and religion not only for its unique and nota-
ble qualities, 2 5 but for its profound influence on the volatile issues
years old, more or less. These skeletons resemble the skeletons of a mod-
em ape .... Therefore man is the ascendant of this prehistoric race of
jungle inhabitants .... How does science know?
Note, An Echo From the Scopes Tria, supra note 9, at 130.
21. The first assault was formulated by reference to the interpretive case of
Green v. Allen, 24 Tenn. (5 Humph.) 170 (1844), which held that the provision was
directory rather than mandatory. The inference was that failure of a statute to
comply was not fatal to its continued validity. Secondly, the provision was seen as
simply too vague and uncertain in its meaning to be enforceable. 154 Tenn. at 116-
17, 289 S.W. *at 366. The final reason for the limited interpretation centered on the
court's reluctance to impose its judgment on the school system as to what particu-
lar course of study tends to "cherish science." Id. at 117-18, 289 S.W. at 366.
22. 154 Tenn. at 118, 289 S.W. at 366. The federal conterpart of this provision is,
of course, found in the first amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. 154 Tenn. at 118-19, 289 S.W. at 367. "So far as we know, the denial or affir-
mation of such a theory does not enter into any recognized mode of worship." Id.
at 118, 289 S.W. at 367.
24. Id. at 119, 289 S.W. at 367.
25. Along with the Sacco-Vanzetti case it was one of the law cases of this
century that drew the attention of the world to America. The case is at
once regarded as a milestone in the history of American freedom and as a
case which made America ridiculous in the eyes of the civilized world.
Kalven, A Commemorative Casenote: Scopes v. State, 27 U. CH. L REV. 505, 506
surrounding control of public schools in a democratic society. 26
The case represents a recognition by the courts of that day of the
limitations to which the judicial system must be confined with re-
spect to human lives and values which transcend even legal
interference. 27
III. THE ANTI-EVOLUTION LAwS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause of the first amendment 28 has tradi-
tionally been interpreted by the courts as requiring governmental
neutrality in religious or theological matters.29 The numerous
cases on the subject seem to suggest three guidelines or tests
which must be met for a particular enactment to satisfy this re-
quirement of neutrality. First, the primary motive or purpose of
the law must be secular. Second, the actual effect of the law must
not enhance nor inhibit religion, and third, the law must not fos-
ter an active involvement of the government in religious activi-
ties. 30 Although these general precepts have emerged from the
cases, it would be misleading to suggest that analysis of legisla-
tion which calls the establishment clause into issue is precise and
free from difficulty. Due perhaps to the generality of the clause
itself, the opinions of the Court have reflected considerable confu-
sion and internal inconsistency in determining the proper recon-
ciliation of the competing interests involved. 31
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Kalven]. See also supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
26. See Kalven, supra note 25 at 521.
27. "The Scopes case may provide the most interesting example on record of
the power of ridicule as precedent and of the power of public opinion to nullify
law." See Kalven, supra note 25 at 507.
28. The first amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). The Epperson case
was the Supreme Court's reaction to the anti-evolution controversy. See infra
notes 39-47 and accompanying text. The Court defined the mandates of the estab-
lishment clause as precluding governmental hostility toward any religion, or parti-
ality toward non-religion. It emphasized that no public entity, consistent with the
first amendment, may aid, assist, or promote religious theories or philosophies of
any kind. 393 U.S. at 104. "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutral-
ity between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." 393 U.S.
at 104.
30. See Commission for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973). The case of Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) summarizes these
three traditional guidelines in an attempt to illustrate the primary objectives of
the establishment clause. The Court refers to governmental sponsorship, financial
support, and entanglement with religious matters as the primary evils to be elimi-
nated. 397 U.S. at 668, 674.
31. 397 U.S. at 668.
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Perhaps the most frequently cited case for defining the parame-
ters of the establishment clause is Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion.32 In finding that a New Jersey statute which, in effect,
authorized free public transportation for children attending Cath-
olic schools 33 did not violate the establishment clause, the Ever-
son court stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to pro-
fess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church
and State.'
3 4
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep
of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calcu-
lated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute. In
attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's
opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulatng general principles
on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the
opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too
sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in rela-
tion to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.
Id. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 125-26 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
33. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 3, n.1 which contains the entire
text of the statute. The statute delegated to the local school district the power to
make rules and contracts for the transportation of students to and from schools.
Acting pursuant to this statute, the township board of education authorized reim-
bursement to parents for money spent to transport their children on public buses.
Part of this public expenditure was payment for transportation of certain children
to parochial schools. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 15-16. This oft quoted paragraph has become known variously as the
"Everson," "wall of separation," "absolutist," or the "no-aid" principle. The Court
is suggesting that, although a law may not aid one religion more than another, it
may still violate the establishment clause if it benefits all religions alike. The case
also suggests that not every law which aids a religious institution in a remote or
incidental manner is necessarily invalid. See Commission for Pub. Ed. & Relig.
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973). The critics of the Everson opinion, in
taking note of the many friendly contacts between government and institutional-
ized religion at the time of the adoption of the first amendment, claimed that the
intention of Congress in adopting the establishment clause could not possibly
The Court noted that the state provided no financial or legisla-
tive backing to parochial schools and concluded, pursuant to the
guidelines which it furthered, that the legislation in question did
no more than provide a general program to assist parents in
transporting their children to and from school, regardless of their
religion.3 5
Challenges based upon the establishment clause have generally
concerned one of two central issues: public aid to religious
schools36 and religious activities in public schools.37 The two ar-
eas reflect a larger consideration of the general relationship be-
tween religion and education, and have been said to represent
governmental drives "to abridge, in the name of education, the
complete division of religion and civil authority which our forefa-
thers made."38
Litigation concerning the anti-evolution and balanced treatment
laws falls within the classification of religious activities in public
schools and provides perhaps the finest example of the imple-
mentation of the establishment clause. The issue was brought
before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Epperson
v. Arkansas. 39
have been to erect a wall of separation between religion and government. L. PFEF-
FER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 25,26 (1977).
35. 330 U.S. at 18. 'The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here." Id.
36. See Commission for Pub. Educ. and Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (three financial aid programs in form of direct money grants, tuition reim-
bursement, and tax relief for nonpublic school children found to be in violation of
establishment clause); Levitt v. Commission for Pub. Educ. and Relig. Liberty, 413
U.S. at 472 (1973) (legislation appropriating funds to reimburse nonpublic schools
for various educational expenses found to be in violation of establishment clause);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Rhode Island legislation providing for a
15% salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools found to be unconstitu-
tional); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (legislative enactment requir-
ing public school authorities to lend, free of charge, textbooks to students in
private school found not.to violate establishment clause); 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (New
Jersy statute authorizing use of public funds for transportation of students to pa-
rochial school found not to be violation of Constitution).
37. The thrust of this comment will be directed at the issue of religion in pub-
lic schools with respect to anti-evolution laws. Among the prevalent cases to be
discussed with respect to parallel sub-issues will be: Abington Township School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (statute requiring that passages from Bible
be read in public schools, found to violate first amendment); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (legislative enactment allowing for recital of religious prayer in
public schools found to be unconstitutional); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(New York statute which permits public shcools to release students during school
hours to attend religious centers for religious instruction found not to violate es-
tablishment clause); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (state sanc-
tioned religious instruction in public schools found unconstitutional).
38. 330 U.S. at 63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
39. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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In Epperson an Arkansas public school teacher brought an ac-
tion challenging the constitutionality of Arkansas' anti-evolution
statute.40 Essentially, the enactment made it unlawful for a
teacher in any public school or university to teach the theory of
evolution.41 The controversy arose in the context of the proper in-
struction of a biology class in a Little Rock high school. The
school administration adopted a textbook which contained a
chapter concerning the theory of man's evolution from a lower
form of animal, and Ms. Epperson was to utilize this book in her
classroom instruction.42 Faced with the prospect of dismissal for
violation of the anti-evolution statute for refusing to use the book,
she filed suit seeking declaratory relief.43
Utilizing a variety of cases to illustrate the principle that gov-
ernment must remain neutral in matters of religious doctrine, 44
the Court found the Arkansas anti-evolution statute to be in viola-
tion of the establishment clause.45 The Court reasoned that the
primary motive behind the prohibition of the teaching of the the-
ory of evolution was to further the beliefs of the fundamentalists
and to prevent the dispersion of doctrine contrary to that of di-
vine creation.46 As such, the Court concluded, the Arkansas law
"cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality."47
The various lower court cases decided subsequent to Epperson
40. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. 393 U.S. at 100.
43. The court of Chancery held that the statute violated the first amendment
guarantee of free speech in that it hindered the quest for knowledge, restricted the
freedom to learn, and restrained the freedom to teach. Id. at 100-01. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas reversed the Chancery court's findings by concluding that the
statute in question was a valid exercise of the state's power to mandate the curric-
ulum in public schools. Id. at 101.
44. See Id. at 106-07. See also supra notes 36 and 37.
45. The Court concluded that the anti-evolution laws compel a result similar
to those cases finding practices such as study of the Bible and free transportation
of students to parochial schools, unconstitutional. 393 U.S. at 106-07. 'These
precedents inevitably determine the result in the present case." Id. at 107.
46. 393 U.S. at 107-08.
[T]here can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers
from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief
of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine
as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law
may be justified by considerations of State Policy other than the religious
views of some of its citizens.
Id. at 107.
47. Id. at 109.
involving the anti-evolution issue48 resolved the problem in a sim-
ilar fashion. Relying upon Epperson, the respective courts were
compelled to find that the laws in question inherently favored
religious doctrine and, as such, were in violation of the establish-
ment clause.49
Analyzing the anti-evolution statutes in their traditional form,
there appears to be little doubt, in light of the Epperson decision
and numerous analogous holdings,SO that the laws cannot survive
the strict mandates of the establishment clause. With respect to
the three guidelines which have developed to aid analysis in this
area5 ' we have seen first that generally the primary motivating
force behind the enactments has not been secular in nature.5 2
The purpose of the laws has uniformly been viewed as the sup-
pression of the teaching of theories which deny the divine crea-
tion of man.5 3 This factor alone is sufficient to invalidate the anti-
evolution statutes according to prevalent views of the Court; but
the laws fail in other areas as well. Scrutiny of the primary effect
of the laws reveals an inherent enhancement of non-secular be-
liefs. This observation is based upon the natural result of a prohi-
bition of one mode of thought and the consequent heightened
recognition of an opposing view.5 4 It is clear that the prohibition
of the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools ad-
vances the doctrinal beliefs of the proponents of divine creation.
The third guideline, state entanglement in religious activites, pro-
vides further authority for the perceived invalidity of the anti-
evolution statutes. The laws have been viewed by the courts as
promoting active involvement by government entities in non-sec-
ular matters and as such an intrusion by the state upon religion.55
48. See, e.g., Daniels v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (This case held that
a Tennessee statute requiring: 1.) equal instruction of divine creation whenever
any other theory of man's origin is taught, and 2.) that a disclaimer be included
with the teaching of theories other than divine creation, to the effect that such
concept is only a theory, was in violation of the establishment clause); Wright v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Texas 1972), aff'd 486 F.2d 137
(5th Cir. 1973) (action brought by students to enjoin Board of Education from
teaching theory of evolution); Smith v. State, 242 So.2d 692 (Miss. 1970) (court
found Mississippi statute prohibiting teaching of evolution in public schools to be
in violation of establishment clause).
49. In each of these decisions attempts were made to distinguish Epperson.
The attempts were usually based upon differing language in the statutes in ques-
tion, see, e.g., 242 So.2d at 697.
50. See supra note 37.
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. 393 U.S. at 107-08 n.15.
54. The effect of the law becomes an issue of greater concern with respect to
the current "balanced treatment" enactments. See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
55. "The danger of intrusions by organized religious and quasi-religious polit-
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The religious affiliations and activities of the proponents of these
enactments provide evidence of the blurred division of the roles
of church and state in this regard.5 6
Perhaps out of recognition of the futility of attempts to enact a
constitutional form of traditional anti-evolution statutes providing
for an out-and-out prohibition on the teaching of evolution, anti-
evolution laws and litigation surrounding these laws have as-
sumed a new perspective. The current laws are termed "balanced
treatment" acts,5 7 and the argument propounded in their favor is
based upon the idea that the divine concept of man's creation is
not premised upon religious doctrine but is in fact a field of sci-
ence. The most recent judicial response to this contemporary
twist of the controversy is found in the case of McLean v. Arkan-
sos Board of Education58 and centers upon establishment clause
analysis.
In McLean, the legislative enactment in question,5 9 entitled the
"Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science
Act" provided in relevant part; "[p]ublic schools within this state
shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolu-
tion-science." 60 The primary justification for the law as asserted
by the defendants was that the statement of divine creation is
supported by empirical scientific data and is to be taught in a
manner which highlights scientific rather that religious events.6 1
ical groups upon the curriculum of the public schools generates apprehension
equal to fears of excessive government direction of church schools and churches."
Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Con.sumption?, 27
VAND. L. REV. 209, 226 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Le Clercq].
56. See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark.
1982), where in reference to the adoption of ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to 1669
(Supp. 1981), the court states:
At Reverend Blout's request, the Evangelical Fellowship unanimously
adopted a resolution to seek introduction of [the Act] in the Arkansas
Legislature. A committee composed of two ministers, .. . was appointed
to implement the resolution. [One of the ministers] obtained... a re-
vised copy of the model act which he transmitted to... a business associ-
ate of Senator James L. Hoisted, with the request that [the associate]
prevail upon Holsted to introduce the act.
Holsted, a self-described "born again" Christian Fundamentalist, intro-
duced the act in the Arkansas Senate.
Id. at 1262.
57. See supra note 2.
58. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to 1669 (Supp. 1981).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1663, (Supp. 1981).
61. 529 F. Supp at 1264. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1666 (Supp. 1981) provides:
Definitions. As used in this Act [§§ 80-1663 - 80-1670]:
The court emphatically disagreed with these contentions and con-
cluded that the statute violated the establishment clause.
The court examined the characteristics which must necessarily
exist before any ideology may be asserted as a science. Noted
were five essential elements: 1.) it is guided by natural law; 2.) it
must be explained by reference to natural law; 3.) it is testable
against the empirical world; 4.) its conclusions do not necessarily
represent the final word; they are tentative; 5.) It is falsifiable.62
The court then concluded that by exploring the origins and meth-
odology of the area, creation-science, as defined in the Act, is not
a science at all. 63 Based upon the true origins of the concept pro-
pounded by the defendants, the court proclaimed that it was over-
whelmingly clear that "both the purpose and effect of the Act...
is the advancement of religion in the public schools." 64 It was as-
serted that an examination of the statute beyond its scientific
mask would reveal the true unmentioned reference to the Book of
Genesis as the underlying thesis of the doctrine65 and would com-
pel a finding that the Act is unquestionably a statement of reli-
gion.66 Viewing the enactment in this way, constitutional analysis
of the matter became a simple task. The court applied the tradi-
tional establishment clause principles as introduced in Everson
and other similar cases 67 and concluded that creation-science as
expressed in the Act has, as its only real effect, the enhancement
of religious principles and as such fails both the first and second
(a) "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and in-
ferences from those scientific evidences. Creation-science includes the
scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate: (1) Sudden crea-
tion of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (2) The insufficiency of
mutation and natural selection in bringing about developement of all liv-
ing kinds from a single organism; (3) Changes only within fixed limits of
originally created kinds of plants and animals; (4) Separate ancestry for
man and apes; (5) Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, in-
cluding the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent
inception of the earth and living kinds.
Id.
62. 529 F. Supp. at 1267.
63. Id. at 1267-69. The court explained that since the concept is based on a
sudden creation from total void, it depends upon a supernatural intervention
which is not founded on natural law, and is therefore not a science. Id. at 1267.
The court also pointed out deficiencies in the language of the act and concluded
that such pitfalls clearly indicate the concept fails to conform to the essentials of
science. Id. at 1268. The court was influenced by evidence of inconsistent thinking
among proponents of divine creation. Divine creation is classified as a science,
and yet, followers practice a dogmatic, absolutist approach to the concept. Id. at
1268-69.
64. Id. at 1264.
65. Id. at 1264-65. "The ideas of 4(a)(1) are not merely similar to the literal
interpretation of Genesis; they are identical and parallel to no other story of crea-
tion." Id. at 1265.
66. Id. at 1264-65.
67. Id. at 1257-58. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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portions of the traditional establishment clause test.68 With re-
spect to state entanglement with religion 69 the court noted that
under the Act, involvement of the state in screening textbooks for
impermissible religious references and monitoring classrooms for
prohibited instruction would necessarily require state officials to
make delicate religious judgments which would create an exces-
sive and prohibited entanglement with religion.70
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause of the first amendment 7 ' prohibits gov-
ernment entities from enacting legislation which would inhibit
the free exercise of religion.72 The literal wording of the clause
suggests a limitless restriction on such enactments, 73 however,
subsequent interpretations have placed important qualifications
on its meaning.
One of the earliest cases to define the guaranty of the free exer-
cise clause was Reynolds v. United States. 74 The Reynolds Court
seemed to draw a distinction between religious belief, and re-
ligious conduct pursuant to these beliefs, stating that government
may not pass laws which interfere with mere convictions, yet are
justified in enacting statutory limitations upon practices. 75 This
principle was subsequently extended in the case of Minersville
68. 529 F. Supp. at 1272. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70. 529 F. Supp. at 1272.
71. See supra note 28.
72. Id. "The free exercise clause was designed to allow the individual the
freedom to exercise his beliefs without government infringement. This protects
the individual's freedom of conscience and mandates that the state remain neutral
to avoid infringing upon those beliefs." Note, Objective Criteria for Defining Reli-
gion for the First Amendment - Malnak v. Yogi, 11 U. ToL L. REV. 988, 989 (1980).
73. The clause mandates, without qualification, that Congress shall make "no"
law prohibiting or abridging the freedom involved. See supra note 28.
74. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Reynolds involved a challenge by members of the Mor-
mon church to an act of Congress making the practice of polygamy a crime in the
territories of the United States. The free exercise issue arose out of the asserted
Mormon doctrine which imposed upon all male members a duty to practice polyg-
amy. The Court framed the question as "whether religious belief can be accepted
as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land." Id. at 162.
75. Id. at 166-67. "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a neces-
sary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil gov-
ernment under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?" Id. at
166. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the Court states:
"[Tihe Amendment embraces two concepts, -freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Con-
duct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 303-04.
School District v. Gobitis, 76 which held that religious convictions
could not relieve an individual from obedience to an otherwise
valid general law which has a purely secular purpose.77 The more
recent decisions concerning the free exercise clause have sug-
gested a balancing approach, based upon the competing interests
involved and the existence of reasonable alternatives, to satisfy
the constitutional commitment to freedom of religion.7 8 This ap-
proach, often referred to as the compelling state interest test,
mandates that "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion." 79
With respect to the anti-evolution and balanced treatment legis-
lation, the issue of the free exercise of religion usually arises in
defense of the enactment in question. It has been noted that the
subjection of students in public schools to curriculums containing
studies of evolution of man from a lower order of animal is, in
some instances, contrary to essential religious beliefs and is
therefore an infringement upon the student's free exercise
rights.80 This assertion is based upon the inducement of belief in
incompatible views, violation of separatist practices and compul-
76. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
77. The facts of the Gobitis case provide an excellent example of the concept.
In that case a state regulation required all public school students to participate in
a daily ceremony of saluting the American flag and reciting the pledge of alle-
giance. The Court held that conscientious scruples based on religious grounds
were insufficient to relieve an individual from obedience to a law which was not
directed toward a religious belief. 310 U.S. at 594-95. Gobitis was subsequently
overruled (see supra note 76) but the principle which it established remains in-
tact. See Pfeffer, supra note 34 at 34-35.
78. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (attack by members of
Amish faith upon the constitutional validity of law which required school attend-
ance until age 16); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state unemployment
benefits unconstitutionally denied to member of Seventh-Day Adventist Church
who was discharged from employment because of her refusal to work on Satur-
days, the Sabbath Day of her faith).
79. 406 U.S. at 215. "[I1t must appear either that the State does not deny the
free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest
of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free
Exercise Clause." Id. at 214. The interests of the states in promoting the health,
safety, and general welfare are generally seen as "compelling" and will often over-
ride individual religious liberties. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (military requirements override religious convictions based on particular
war); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting minors from
selling any item, including religious materials, on public streets upheld as protec-
tive of safety needs); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (statute requir-
ing license to be acquired before attempting religious solicitation held invalid
because statute did more than merely restrict the time or manner of solicitation).
80. Comment, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools,
87 YALE LJ. 515, 523 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of Religion ].
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sion of unconscionable declarations of belief.8 1 In support of
these contentions, cases such as West Virginia State Board of Ed-
ucation v. Barnett8 2 and Wisconsin v. Yoder 83 are informative. In
both cases the court viewed the religious convictions of the indi-
viduals involved as overriding the incompatible interest of the
state and allowed an exemption of the student from the imposed
practices. 84 The cases seem to suggest that secular views con-
trary to religious beliefs will generally not withstand attack under
free exercise principles in the absence of overriding interests,8 5
and thus may compel the conclusion that the study of evolution in
public schools interferes with religious beliefs and practices to a
degree sufficient to mandate the prohibition of such study.86 In
such situations, it is clear that the state, in maintaining instruc-
tion in the general theory of evolution, seeks to promote several
interests including educating its citizens, designing adequate pub-
lic school curricula, and presenting the theory in an overall at-
tempt to effectively teach biology.87 If the opponents of the study
are to be successful, therefore, it is evident that it must be shown
that the religious beliefs involved override these interests. 88
In McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education,89 the court ana-
lyzed the defendants' free exercise argument pursuant to differ-
ent grounds. The defendants asserted that the concept of man's
evolution is, in effect, a religiongO which is contrary to other reli-
81. Id. at 523-26.
82. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the Court invalidated legislation compel-
ling a salute and pledge of allegiance to the American flag.
83. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra note 78.
84. See supra notes 78 & 82.
85. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86. In Yoder, an Amish student was granted an exemption from a law which
required school attendance until age 16. In Barnette, an exemption from a law re-
quiring the student to salute and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag was
given. It would be reasonable to suggest that the exemptions granted in these
cases are analogous to the anti-evolution cases and require that students be enti-
tled to an exemption from the study of evolution, if such study interfers with reli-
gious convictions.
87. Comment, supra note 80, at 541.
88. It has been suggested that the claim of creationists based on the free exer-
cise clause only threatens a small portion of the state interest in education or cur-
ricula. Furthermore, these asserted state interests, as compared to other
government objectives (i.e., vaccination of pupils, teacher loyalty) cannot be found
to be "compelling" in nature. See Freedom of Religion, supra note 80, at 541-42.
89. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark, 1982). See also supra notes 58-70 and accompa-
nying text.
90. 529 F. Supp. at 1273.
gious views of some students9 ' and thus its teaching is a violation
of the free exercise clause. The defendants further contended
that the only way to remedy this problem would be to give bal-
anced treatment to creation science which is more consistent with
their religious beliefs.92 The court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that evolution as a religion is inconsistent with clearly es-
tablished case law,93 but stated that even upon a contrary finding
the free exercise contention would fail. Hypothesizing that crea-
tion science is, in fact, a science and not a religion, the court
failed to see "how the teaching of such a science could 'neutralize'
the religious nature of evolution."9 4 Thus, the court rejected the
contention.
C. Freedom of Speech
Perhaps the most vital mandate of the first amendment is the
guarantee of freedom of speech.95 This liberty has been recog-
nized as "the indispensible condition . . . of nearly every other
form of freedom" 96 and essential to the "foundation of a free soci-
ety."97 Though it has been stated in many ways, it is clear that
the primary function of the free speech clause is the prohibition
of government suppression of ideas.9 8 The overriding objective of
91. 529 F. Supp. at 1273. The court made reference to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-
1669(d) (1981 Supp.) (referred to in McLean as Act 590) which provides in perti-
nent part: "Evolution-Science is contrary to the religious convictions or moral val-
ues or philosophical beliefs of many students and parents, including individuals of
many different religious faiths and with diverse moral and philosophical beliefs."
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1669(d) (Supp. 1981).
92. 529 F. Supp. at 1274. See also supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
Allowing creation science to be taught along with evolution science in public
schools may give rise to another free exercise problem. Teaching the doctrine of
spontaneous creation pursuant to scientific principles invariably raises questions
as to the validity of the theory, and often leads to the conclusion that the doctrine
is religious in nature. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. If this con-
clusion is accepted, the religious doctrine will be contrary to other beliefs, and
may be prohibited by the free exercise clause. See Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 228.
93. 529 F. Supp. at 1274.
94. Id.
95. The pertinent part of the first amendment states: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONST. amend I.
The fourteenth amendment has been interpreted to embrace the liberties of the
first amendment, and thereby provides protection from impairment by the states.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
96. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
97. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479. 486 (1960).
98. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
717-18 (1978). Since the truth of any idea or statement can only be determined in
the "marketplace" of competing ideas, the government cannot legitimately restrict
the dissemination of speech. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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this prohibition is the enhancement of individual contributions to
the health and welfare of society.99 While it is clear that freedom
of speech requires a great degree of judicial protection, it has
never been viewed by the Court as absolute,OO in spite of the lit-
eral wording of the clause. Thus, the view that in certain situa-
tions an individual's right to freely communicate ideas must give
way to other societal interests has prevailed.l0 l Nevertheless, it
is evident that only governmental interests of the highest order
will be seen as sufficient to override the guarantee of freedom of
speech. 0 2
With regard to expression of ideas in the classroom, the Court
has stated that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools."103 Academic freedom has been seen by the Court to be
essential to the future of the growth and stablity of our nation and
necessary for wide exposure to a robust exchange of ideas. 104
Thus, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to allow the de-
velopment of widespread academic expression in an effort to cre-
ate in the classroom a marketplace of ideas.105
Recognition of these principles delineates the traditional free-
99. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 98, at 718.
100. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
101. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
[T]hat a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who
abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to
incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of
organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is
not open to question.
Id. at 371.
102. The "clear-and-present-danger" test for determining the limits of speech
first appeared in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court stated:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at
52. Among the evils which Congress may protect are threats to the security of the
state, disorder in the public forum and threats to the psyches of the people. See
generally HAIMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1977).
103. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). "Our nation is deeply commit-
ted to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment. Keyrshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
104. 385 U.S. at 603. The Court in Sweeny v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) stated: "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust."
105. See Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 235. See also 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). It has been asserted that the proper foundation in aca-
dom of speech arguments asserted in opposition to the anti-evolu-
tion laws. In the situation where an enactment prohibits the
teaching of the theory of evolution, the statute may be attacked as
contrary to the state interest of requiring that science or biology
be taught in a professionally acceptable manner and thus as an
invalid restraint on free speech.106 It has been noted that the
proper teaching of biology necessarily entails examination of
evolution, and that deprivation of instruction as to this prevailing
scientific thought would result in the denial of a significant part of
science education to the student and thus frustrate a fundamental
objective of the public schools.107 Additionally, proponents of the
anti-evolution laws offer no interest in support of the enactments,
which could be seen to be of a sufficient magnitude to justify the
suppression of the teaching of evolution.108
With regard to the balanced treatment acts, illustrated by the
recent case of McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, analysis
pursuant to the free speech clause similarly revolves around the
infringement of the academic freedom of teachers and students.
In McLean, it was contended that a law which required the equal
treatment of divine creation whenever the theory of evolution is
taught in effect "prohibits teachers from teaching what they be-
lieve should be taught or requires them to teach that which they
do not believe is proper."109 The court noted that such an enact-
ment is contrary to the freedom traditionally alloted to school
teachers to teach and emphasize those subjects which he or she
considers to be importantlo and could result in the omission of
demic studies requires that public school teachers be secure in their right to teach
subjects in a professionally responsible manner. Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 236.
106. See Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 235. "The biology or science teacher's in-
terest in communicating concepts that are commonly regarded as valid by the sci-
entific community constitutes preferred speech whose social value should
effectively insulate it against any conceivable state interest." Le Clercq, supra
note 55 at 236.
107. 529 F. Supp. 1255 at 1273.
Evolution is the cornerstone of modern biology, and many courses in pub-
lic schools contain subject matter relating to such varied topics as the age
of the earth, geology and relationships among living things. Any student
who is deprived of instruction as to the prevailing scientific thought on
these topics will be denied a significant part of science education. Such a
deprivation through the high school level would undoubtedly have an im-
pact upon the quality of education in the State's colleges and
universities....
Id.
108. See supra notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text. See also Le Clercq, supra
note 55, at 234. The laws are generally viewed as fundamentalist attempts to intro-
duce religious doctrine into public schools. 'The law's effort was confined to an
attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the
Biblical account .. " 393 U.S. at 109.
109. 529 F. Supp. at 1273.
110. Id. The court considered evidence which indicated that the State Depart-
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subjects by teachers which might trigger the balanced treatment
aspects of the enactment."' To require a public school teacher to
devote class time to coverage of a judicially proclaimed non-scien-
tific theory of creation'1 2 has thus been viewed as an invalid re-
striction upon the freedom of speech of school teachers.1 1 3
IV. THE ANTI-EVOLUTION LAWS AND DUE PROCESS
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" 4 pro-
tects individuals from arbitrary and irrational government inter-
ference with personal liberties.115 The determination as to the
validity of a governmental enactment under the substantive as-
pect of the clause involves an examination of the conflicting inter-
ests involved and the relation of the enactment to the government
objectives sought to be achieved." 6 The level of protection gener-
ally offered to a particular liberty has been seen to be commensu-
rate with the viewed importance of that liberty."i7 With regard to
first amendment rights, it has been stated that "[o Inly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation [of these rights] ."118
ment of Education, local school boards, and administrative officials generally exer-
cise little or no influence upon the subject matter taught in public schools. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
113. See Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 235.
114. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part: "[nior shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
115. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
116. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
117. "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and in-
dustrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought." 348 U.S. at 488. In Williamson, the Court held
that an Oklahoma statute, making it unlawful for any person who is not a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit, duplicate or replace any optical appliances,
was not in violation of the due process clause. The Court weighed the interests
involved and determined that all that would be required to sustain the legislation
would be a rational relation to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 491. This
must be compared to the higher level of review generally accorded where the lib-
erty involved is of a more "fundamental" nature. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), where the Court held that infringement of a fundamental right by state leg-
islation would only be upheld were necessary to support a compelling state inter-
est. Id. at 155-56.
118. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). "The rational connection be-
tween the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice."
Id.
Although due process arguments offered in opposition to anti-
evolution legislation have generally been preempted by narrower
first amendment contentions,1 9 the arguments are nonetheless
valid and often persuasive. With respect to a teacher's liberty to
speak out concerning matters of academic relevance and impor-
tance (such as the theory of evolution), it is clear that this right
may only be sacrificed at the hands of a sufficiently compelling
state interest.120 This argument is equally persuasive as applied
to the balanced treatment acts, in that the teacher must be free
from arbitrary enactments that impose upon him unreasonable
burdens to expand upon matters which have no bearing or rela-
tion to academic topics.'21
Although the decision in Epperson v. Arkansas, 122 which invali-
dated an Arkansas anti-evolution law, was not premised upon due
process grounds, 23 the Court did examine authority for the con-
tention. The Court noted that the earliest cases on the subject of
constitutional guarantees with regard to classroom activities were
decided pursuant to the due process clause. 124 The case of Meyer
v. Nebraska125 was referred to as one such decision and was dis-
cussed by the Court as analogous to the anti-evolution factual
setting.
In Meyer, the Court invalidated, pursuant to the due process
clause, an act of the State of Nebraska which made it a crime to
teach any academic subject in any language other than English to
students who had not passed the eighth grade.' 26 In examining
the state interest asserted as justification for the law127 the Court
proclaimed that such interest was not adequate to override the
119. "For purposes of the present case, we need not reenter the difficult terrain
(of the Due Process Clause] .... Today's [anti-evolution] problem is capable of
resolution in the narrower terms of the First Amendment's prohibition of laws re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 393
U.S. at 105-06.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. "[T]he right. . . of the teacher
to organize a biology course that includes evolution free from state requirements
incorporating religious or other extraneous doctrines - [is] especially deserving
of protection." Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 238.
121. See Le Clercq, supra note 55, at 239.
122. 529 F. Supp. at 1255. See also supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 119.
124. 393 U.S. at 105. "[A]s early as 1923, the Court did not hesitate to condemn
under the Due Process Clause 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the freedom of teach-
ers to teach and of students to learn." Id.
125. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
126. Id. at 396.
127. Id. at 398. The state contended that the object of the legislation was to cre-
ate an "enlightened American citizenship" in the children, and to prevent students
from learning foreign languages before adequately mastering English. Id. at 393-
94.
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fundamental liberties asserted by the teachers and students.128
Thus the challenged statute unreasonably interferred with rights
guaranteed by the due process clause.
With reference to the anti-evolution and balanced treatment
legislation, the asserted interests propounded in their favor have,
as we have seen, 129 not been considered "compelling" 130 and as
such have not been successfully defended on due process
grounds.
V. EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE ANTI-
EVOLUTION LEGISLATION
It is overwhelmingly clear that the case law comprising the in-
terpretation of the first amendment has developed many strong
and unyielding principles, long recognized as impregnable against
legal attack. The preeminence of these principles is nowhere
more evident than in the area of the anti-evolution legislation.
Notwithstanding this realization, it becomes necessary, in the in-
terest of stimulating growth and scholarship, to analyze past judi-
cial treatment in this area and evaluate its impact and validity in
light of the underlying principles which the decisions are founded
upon.
It has been noted that the establishment clause of the first
amendment does not require a complete separation of church and
state in all respects. 131 The cases on the subject, although prohib-
iting concert or dependency among government and religion, have
recognized the difficulty in promoting hostility, suspicion, and un-
friendliness among the two.132 The Court has made allowance for
a wide variety of creeds and beliefs, and has been seen to sponsor
an attitude that shows no partiality to any one group or ideology
yet allows each to flourish according to the spiritual needs of its
dogma.133 As the Court in Zorach v. Clauson'34 stated:
128. Id. at 399-403.
129. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
130. The state interest, however, in prescribing a legitimate and academically
sound school curriculum has been viewed as "legitimate and substantiaL" Le
Clercq, supra note 55, at 240.
131. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
132. Id. The Court made reference to situations where intermingling of the two
are inevitable and healthy: prayer in legislative halls, appeals to God in presiden-
tial messages, and oaths in courtrooms. Id. at 312-13.
133. 343 U.S. at 313.
134. Id. at 306 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld a New York statute which
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects
the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Con-
stitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no reli-
gion over those who do believe. 1 3 5
The necessary overlap of government and religion is traceable
to the very foundation of American constitutional government.136
As the concurring opinion in the famous Scopes decision137 noted,
even sources as fundamental to United States history as the Dec-
laration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation and
Perpetual Union rely heavily upon religious conviction to convey
their meanings.138 Similarly, early United States Supreme Court
cases promoted a complete advocacy of religion in everyday soci-
ety and a recognition of the Christian affirmation in the origin of
American culture. 39 Perhaps these authorities suggest that the
harsh judicial treatment of religious matters in public schools as
typified in our contemporary judiciary is a result not contem-
plated by the framers of the first amendment and is deserving of
reexamination. The holding in the early Scopes case 140 is perhaps
illustrative of the initial and intended treatment of a law which
prohibits the teaching of evolution in public schools. Although
modern courts have uniformly invalidated these enactments it is
important to analyze these decisions in light of traditional prece-
permitted public schools to release students during school hours to attend reli-
gious classes conducted outside school premises.
135. Id. at 313-14.
136. "No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content
by its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment." Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
137. See supra notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
138. The opinion noted such phrases as: "the laws of nature and of nature's
God," "to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator," found in the Declaration of Independence, and language such as,
"[A]nd whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the world," found in the
Articles of Confederation. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 122, 289, S.W. 363, 368
(1927) (Chambliss, J., concurring).
139. See e.g., Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127 (1844), where the Court pro-
claimed: "[w]e are compelled to admit that... Christianity [is] a part of the
Common law of the State... [and] its divine origin and truth are admitted .... "
The decision was rendered without regard to the particular sect or beliefs in-
volved. Id. at 198. See also Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) where the Court goes into a detailed discussion of the religious overtones in
the language of many documents which comprise American history. Id. at 465-70.
"There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language per-
vading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a reli-
gious nation." Id. at 470.
140. See supra notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10: 461, 19831 Anti-Evolution Controversy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dent and to resist approaching the problem from trends of mod-
ern thought which are often divorced from sound legal doctrine.
It has been noted that, although modern interpretation of the
establishment clause prohibits the adoption by a state of a pro-
gram or practice in a public school which aids or opposes any reli-
gion, it nonetheless allows the study of religions and the Bible
from a literary and historic viewpoint, objectively presented as
part of a secular educational program.141 Certain activities in a
public school environment such as legislatively mandated
prayer 142 or Bible reading143 immediately conflict with the estab-
lishment clause, as such practices obviously cannot be effectively
carried out in a secular manner. However, with respect to the
teaching, in public schools, of the divine creation of man as typi-
fied by the balanced treatment statutes,'" the issue is clearly dif-
ferent. It has already been asserted that divine creation is, in
effect, a science and can be taught as such.145 Even amidst the
nonacceptance of these arguments, 14 6 it is not beyond realization
to embody the subject in a nonbiased neutral manner into a
school curriculum with the objective of exposing the student to all
areas of thought on the subject.
With regard to the court's attention to the free speech issues
surrounding the anti-evolution and balanced treatment litigation,
perhaps a greater degree of judicial inquiry is called for.147
It has been said that;
If progress has taught us anything, it is the vital need of freedom in learn-
ing. Perhaps this is the most precious privilege of liberty - the privilege
of knowing, of pursuing untrammeled the paths of discovery, of inquiry, of
invention....
Believing as I do that the freedom of learning is the vital breath of de-
mocracy and progress, I trust that a recognition of its supreme importance
will direct the hand of power and that our public schools and state univer-
sities may enjoy the priceless advantage of courses of instruction
designed to promote the acquisition of all knowledge and may not be
placed under restrictions to prevent it; and that our teachers may be en-
couraged to know and to teach the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
141. 393 U.S. at 106.
142. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
143. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
144. See sspra note 2.
145. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
147. As discussed previously, the primary constitutional mandate utilized in
the cases has been the establishment clause. See supra notes 71-113 and accompa-
nying text.
the truth.
14 8
This view has apparently been shared by the United States
Supreme Court as well. The Court has traditionally expressed its
commitment to the safeguarding of academic freedoms, and the
vigilant protection of constitutional liberties in the classroom.149
The traditional judicial treatment of the balanced treatment legis-
lation,o5 0 however, appears to be in direct opposition to the
Court's description of the classroom as the "marketplace of
ideas."'51 The reluctance of the courts to uphold laws which re-
quire treatment of divine creation in the classroom whenever
evolution is taught appears to be a direct deprivation of students
to gain total knowledge of all the prevalent theories of man's crea-
tion,15 2 and imposes a straightjacket upon scholastic freedom to
learn and teach.
The argument can of course equally be asserted with regard to
laws which prohibit the teaching of the theory of evolution in
public schools. In this regard the academic freedoms have been
blatantly violated, and the laws should not survive first amend-
ment scrutiny. As applied to balanced treatment legislation, how-
ever, the principle that "the First Amendment,. . . does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" 5 3
should override any effort to invalidate the enactment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts have traditionally frowned upon state enactments
prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in public
schools. Similarly, statutory requirements to give the divine
statement of creation equal treatment when the theory of evolu-
tion is taught have also been generally invalidated. The two types
of legislation, however, demonstrate the willingness of state
lawmakers to be influenced by nonsecular interests. The re-
peated appearance of the laws clearly shows the strength in their
support. The persistence of the groups which back the bills has
been unyielding and the current reappearance of the laws in the
form of balanced treatment acts indicate that the controversy is
far from resolved.
148. Harper, An Echo From the Scopes Trial, 30 DICK. L. REV. 125, 126 (1926)
(quoting the words of Hon. Charles Evans Hughes).
149. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 2.
151. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
152. Since man has not yet proven either theory of creation, it would be impos-
sible, with any certainty, to teach the true concept. See supra note 20. For this
reason it is clear that the only equitable means to expose the student to the truth
would be to teach him all known alternatives.
153. 385 U.S. at 603.
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Although various modes of constitutional attack have been uti-
lized, the primary demise of the legislation has been the estab-
lishment clause.15 4 We have seen that at the heart of the
controversy lie two competing interests, each presenting valid
and important arguments which create an issue which for years
has been hotly debated and has created some of the nation's most
controversial litigation.1 55 The central issue in this litigation has
not been the validity of either asserted theory of man's origin, but
rather a determination of the proper role of each in the public
school.
This article has examined the traditional constitutional argu-
ments asserted in favor of and against anti-evolution and bal-
anced treatment laws and has evaluated the judicial response to
these laws in light of these contended arguments. In examining
past and recent decisions on the subject it does not appear that
the courts will yield to fundamentalist pressures to allow religion
to play a greater role in public school curriculums and will con-
tinue to follow rigid past precedent in invalidating the
enactments.
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154. See supra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 8.

